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We study a general equilibrium model with production where ﬁnancial markets are
incomplete. At a competitive equilibrium ﬁrms take their production and ﬁnancial
decisions so as to maximize their value. We show that shareholders unanimously sup-
port value maximization. Furthermore, competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto
eﬃcient. Finally the Modigliani-Miller theorem typically does not hold and the ﬁrms’
corporate ﬁnancing structure is determined at equilibrium. Such results extend to
the case where informational asymmetries are present and contribute to determine the
ﬁrms’ capital structure.
Keywords: capital structure, competitive equilibria, incomplete markets, asymmetric
information
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We study a general equilibrium economy with incomplete markets, production and non-
trivial corporate ﬁnancing decisions. Corporate ﬁnancing decisions are non-trivial because
constraints in ﬁnancial markets, e.g., borrowing constraints on the part of the agents, incom-
plete ﬁnancial markets, asymmetric information between corporate investors and managers
or between bond holders and equity holders, imply that the Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem
does not hold and production and ﬁnancing decisions of ﬁrms cannot be separated.
In this class of economies, indeed because production and ﬁnancing decisions of ﬁrms
cannot be separated, corporate ﬁnance quantities like the capital structure and inside own-
ership levels depend on aggregate shocks as well as on idiosyncratic shocks. Also, corporate
ﬁnance quantities are determined jointly with production decisions and cash ﬂows, therefore
aﬀecting asset prices.
Various foundational issues, in particular regarding the speciﬁcation of a proper objective
function of the ﬁrm when markets are incomplete, have arguably hindered the study of the
macroeconomic properties of these economies as well as the development of the integrated
study of corporate ﬁnance with macroeconomics and asset pricing theory.
In this paper we hence concentrate on the foundational theoretical properties of these
economies. To this end we restrict the analysis to a simple two-period economy along the
lines of classical General Equilibrium models with Incomplete Markets (GEI). Bisin et al.
(2009) extend the analysis to Bewley economies with production, the main workhorse of
heterogeneous agents macroeconomics.1
We consider ﬁrst the case where ﬁrms’ equity cannot be sold short and show that i)
value maximization is unanimously supported by shareholders as the ﬁrm’s objective and ii)
competitive equilibria are constrained eﬃcient. Furthermore we show that iii) the capital
structure of ﬁrms at equilibrium is determinate in a precise and speciﬁc sense. In particular,
it typically varies with aggregate states, over the business cycle.
Our analysis and results extend to the case where ﬁrms can default on the debt they
issue, as well as to the case where agents are allowed to sell stocks short. In the ﬁnal
sections of the paper we also introduce informational asymmetries between the decision
maker in the ﬁrm (e.g., the manager) and equity holders or bondholders. This class of
informational asymmetries provide the backbone of models of the capital structure and of
1See Heathcote et al. (2009) for a recent survey of Bewley models.
1incentive compensation in corporate ﬁnance models. It is important therefore to extend our
analysis to these models if we intend it as a foundation for equilibrium corporate ﬁnance.
We show that unanimity of value maximization continues to obtain for both economies with
moral hazard and with adverse selection. Constrained eﬃciency instead is preserved with
moral hazard but not with adverse selection.2 Also, the Modigliani-Miller theorem does
not hold in general in the presence of asymmetric information as incentive issues further
contribute to determine the ﬁrms’ capital structure.
We ﬁrst introduce the economy with riskless debt and no short sales and the deﬁnition of
equilibrium, in Section 2. In this section, after showing that equilibria always exist, we also
discuss and compare the equilibrium notion considered with the alternative ones adopted in
the previous literature. In Section 3 we present our main results on unanimity, eﬃciency
and ﬁrms’ capital structure. In Section 4 we extend the analysis to account for risky debt
and short sales. Finally in Section 5 we study economies with asymmetric information.
2 The economy
The economy lasts two periods, t = 0,1 and at each date a single consumption good is
available. The uncertainty is described by the fact that at t = 1 one state s out of the
set S = {1,...,S} realizes. We assume for simplicity that there is a single type of ﬁrm
in the economy which produces the good at date 1 using as only input the amount k of
the commodity invested in capital at time 0.3 The output depends on k as well as another
technology choice φ, aﬀecting the stochastic structure of the output at date 1,4 according to
the function f(k,φ;s), deﬁned for k ∈ K,φ ∈ Φ, and s ∈ S. We assume that f(k,φ;s) is
continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in k and concave in k,φ; moreover, Φ,K are closed,
2Bisin and Gottardi (2006) identify an externality in pure exchange insurance economies with adverse
selection which precludes constrained eﬃciency. In the adverse selection economies studied in this paper an
analogous externality appears in production.
3It should be clear from the analysis which follows that our results hold unaltered if the ﬁrms’ technology
were described, more generally, by a production possibility set Y ⊂ RS+1.
4The parameter φ may describe, for instance, the loading on diﬀerent factors aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s output.
To illustrate this, consider the following instance of production function
f(k,φ;s) = [a(s) + φǫ(s)]kα where φ ∈ {0,1} is the loading of the ﬁrm’s cash-ﬂow on the risk component
given by ǫ(s). See also the example in Section 3.3.1.
2compact5 subsets of R+ and 0 ∈ K.
In addition to ﬁrms, there are I types of consumers. Consumer i = 1,..,I has an
endowment of wi
0 units of the good at date 0 and wi(s) units at date 1 in each state s ∈ S, thus
the agent’s endowment is also subject to the shock aﬀecting the economy at t = 1. He is also
endowed with θi
0 units of stock of the representative ﬁrm. Consumer i has preferences over
consumption in the two dates, represented by Eui (ci
0,ci(s)), where ui ( ) is also continuously
diﬀerentiable, increasing and concave.
There is a continuum of ﬁrms, of unit mass, as well as a continuum of consumers of each
type i, which for simplicity is also set to have unit mass.
2.1 Competitive equilibrium
We examine the case where ﬁrms take both production and ﬁnancial decisions, and their
equity and debt are the only assets in the economy. Let the outstanding amount of equity be
normalized to 1 (the initial distribution of equity among consumers satisﬁes
 
i θi
0 = 1) and
assume this is kept constant. Hence the choice of a ﬁrm’s capital structure is only given by
the decision concerning the amount B of bonds issued, which in turn also equals the ﬁrm’s
debt/equity ratio. The problem of the ﬁrm consists in the choice of its production plan k,φ
and its ﬁnancial structure B. To begin with, we assume all ﬁrms’ debt is risk free.6
Firms are perfectly competitive and hence take prices as given. The notion of price
taking behavior has no ambiguity when referred to the bond price p. For equity, however,
the situation is more complex, since a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow, and hence the return on equity, is
[f(k,φ;s) − B] and varies with the ﬁrm’s production and ﬁnancing choices, k,φ,B. Thus
equity is a diﬀerent “product” for diﬀerent choices of the ﬁrm. What should be its price
when all this continuum of diﬀerent “products” are not actually traded in the market? In
this case the price is only a “conjecture”, entertained by ﬁrms, as pointed out by Grossman
and Hart (1979). This can be described by a map q(k,φ,B) specifying the market valuation
of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow for any possible choice k,φ,B.7
When ﬁnancial markets are complete, the present discounted valuation of any future
5The condition that the set of admissible values of k is bounded above is by no means essential and is
only introduced for simplicity.
6We shall allow for the possibility that ﬁrms’ default on their debt in Section 5.1.
7These price maps are also referred to as price perceptions (see Grossman and Hart (1979), Kihlstrom
and Matthews (1990) and Magill and Quinzii (1998)).
3payoﬀ is uniquely determined by the price of the existing assets. This is no longer true
when markets are incomplete, in which case the prices of the existing assets do not allow
to determine unambiguously the value of any future cash ﬂow. The speciﬁcation of the
price conjecture is thus more problematic in such case (see also the discussion in the next
section). Still, ﬁrms operate on the basis of a given price conjecture q(k,φ,B) and choose
their production and ﬁnancing plans k,φ,B so as to maximize their value, as determined by
such pricing map and the bond price8. The ﬁrm’s problem is then:
V = max
k,φ,B
−k + q(k,φ,B) + pB (1)
subject to the solvency constraint (ensuring that the bonds issued are risk free):
f(k,φ;s) ≥ B, ∀s ∈ S (2)
Let ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B denote the solutions to this problem.
At t = 0, each consumer i chooses his portfolio of equity and bonds, θi and bi respectively,
so as to maximize his utility, taking as given the price of bonds p and the price of equity
q. In the present environment a consumer’s long position in equity identiﬁes a ﬁrm’s equity
holder, who may have a voice in the ﬁrm’s decisions. It should then be treated as conceptually
diﬀerent from a short position in equity, which is not simply a negative holding of equity.
To begin with, we rule out altogether the possibility of short sales and assume that agents
cannot short-sell the ﬁrm equity nor its debt:
b
i ≥ 0, θ
i ≥ 0, ∀i (3)












0 + [−k + q + p B ]θ
i
0 − q θ




i(s) + [f(k,φ;s) − B ]θ
i + b
i, ∀s ∈ S (6)
Let ¯ θi,¯ bi,¯ ci
0,(¯ ci(s))s∈S denote the solutions of this problem. In equilibrium, the following
8We will later show that such decision is unanimously supported by the ﬁrm’s shareholders.
4market clearing conditions for the assets must hold:9
 
i bi ≤ B
 
i θi ≤ 1
(7)
In addition, the equity price map faced by ﬁrms must satisfy the following consistency
condition:
Ci) q(¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B) = q;
This condition requires that, in equilibrium, the price of equity conjectured by ﬁrms coincides
with the price of equity, faced by consumers in the market: ﬁrms’ conjectures are “correct” in
equilibrium. We also restrict out of equilibrium conjectures by ﬁrms, requiring they satisfy:






, ∀k,φ,B, where MRS
i
(s) denotes the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption at date 0 and at date 1 in state s
for consumer i, evaluated at his equilibrium consumption level ¯ ci.
Condition Cii) says that for any k,φ,B the value of the equity price map q(k,φ,B) equals the
highest marginal valuation - across all consumers in the economy - of the cash ﬂow associated
to k,φ,B. The consumers’ marginal rates of substitutions MRS
i
(s) used to determine the
market valuation of the future cash ﬂow of a ﬁrm are taken as given, unaﬀected by the ﬁrm’s
choice of k,φ,B. This is the sense in which, in our economy, ﬁrms are competitive: each ﬁrm
is “small” relative to the mass of consumers and each consumers holds a negligible amount
of shares of the ﬁrm.
To better understand the meaning of condition Cii), note that the consumers with the
highest marginal valuation for the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow when the ﬁrm chooses k,φ,B are those
willing to pay the most for the ﬁrm’s equity in that case and the only ones willing to buy
equity - at the margin - at the price given by Cii). Under condition Ci), as we show in (8)
below, such property is clearly satisﬁed for the ﬁrms’ equilibrium choice ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B. Condition
Cii) requires that the same is true for any other possible choice k,φ,B: the value attributed
to equity equals the maximum any consumer is willing to pay for it. Note that this would
be the equilibrium price of equity of a ﬁrm who were to “deviate” from the equilibrium
9We state here the conditions for the case of symmetric equilibria, where all ﬁrms take the same production
and ﬁnancing decision, so that only one type of equity is available for trade to consumers. They can however
be easily extended to the case of asymmetric equilibria as, for instance, the one considered in the example
of Section 3.2.1.
5choice ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B and choose k,φ,B instead: the supply of equity with cash ﬂow corresponding
to k,φ,B is negligible and, at such price, so is its demand. In this sense, we can say that
condition Cii) imposes a consistency condition on the out of equilibrium values of the equity
price map; that is, it corresponds to a “reﬁnement” of the equilibrium map, somewhat
analogous to backward induction. Summarizing,
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium of the economy is a collection
 ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B,{¯ ci, ¯ θi,¯ bi}i, ¯ p, ¯ q,q( )
 
such that: i) ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B solve the ﬁrm problem (1) s.t. (2) given
¯ p,q( ); ii) for all i, ¯ ci, ¯ θi,¯ bi solve consumer i’s problem (4) s.t. (3), (5) and (6) for given
¯ p, ¯ q; iii) markets clear, (7) holds; iv) the equity price map q( ) is consistent, that is satisﬁes
the consistency conditions Ci) and Cii).
It readily follows from the consumers’ ﬁrst order conditions that in equilibrium the price of
equity and the bond satisfy:






(s)(f(¯ k, ¯ φ;s) − ¯ B)
 
(8)








as stated in consistency condition Ci).
Remark 1 It is also of interest to point out that, when the price conjectures satisfy condi-
tion Cii), the model is equivalent to one where markets for all possible ‘types’ of equity are
open (that is, equity corresponding to any possible value of k,φ,B is available for trade to
consumers) and, in equilibrium all such markets - except the one corresponding to ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B -
clear at zero trade.10
To see this, suppose that consumers can trade any claim with payoﬀ [f(k,φ;s) − B ], at the
price q(k,φ,B), for all (k,φ) ∈ Φ × K and B satisfying (2). The expressions of the budget


























[f(k,φ;s) − B ]dθ
i(k,φ,B) + b
i, ∀s ∈ S (9)
10An analogous speciﬁcation of the price conjecture has been earlier considered by Makowski (1980),
Makowski (1983), Makowski and Ostroy (1987) in a competitive equilibrium model with diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts, and by Allen and Gale (1991) and Pesendorfer (1995) in models of ﬁnancial innovation. See also
Geanakoplos (2004).
6Similarly, to the market clearing conditions in (7) we should add:
 
i θi (k,φ,B) ≤ 0 for
all (k,φ,B)  = (¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B). It is immediate to verify that, when condition Cii) holds, if ¯ ci, ¯ θi,¯ bi
solves consumer i’s problem (4) subject to (3), (5) and (6), a solution to the problem of
maximizing i’s utility subject to (9) obtains again at ¯ ci,¯ bi and θi(¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B) = ¯ θi, θi(k,φ,B) = 0
for all other (k,φ,B)  = (¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B). This follows from the fact that the utility of all consumers
is continuously diﬀerentiable and concave in the holdings of any type of equity and, when
q(k,φ,B) satisﬁes condition Cii), their marginal utility of a trade in equity of any type
(k,φ,B)  = (¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B), evaluated at zero trade, is less or equal than its price.
Hence the equilibrium allocation is unchanged if consumers are allowed to trade all possible
types of equity at these prices. Note that this argument crucially relies on the no short sale
condition; see also Hart (1979).
Deﬁnition 1 of a competitive equilibrium is stated for simplicity for the case of sym-
metric equilibria, where all ﬁrms choose the same production plan. When the equity price
map satisﬁes the consistency conditions Ci) and Cii) the ﬁrms’ choice problem is not con-
vex. Asymmetric equilibria might therefore exist, in which diﬀerent ﬁrms choose diﬀerent
production plans. The proof of existence of equilibria indeed requires that we allow for such
asymmetric equilibria, so as to exploit the presence of a continuum of ﬁrms of the same type
to convexify the ﬁrms’ choice problem. A standard argument allows then to show that ﬁrms’
aggregate supply is convex valued and hence that the existence of (possibly asymmetric)
competitive equilibria holds. We relegate a sketch of the proof in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 A competitive equilibrium always exist.
2.2 Objective function of the ﬁrm
Starting with the initial contributions of Dreze (1974), Grossman and Hart (1979) and Duﬃe
and Shafer (1986), a large literature has dealt with the question of what is the appropriate
objective function of the ﬁrm when markets are incomplete.11 The issue arises because, as
mentioned above, ﬁrms’ production decisions may aﬀect the set of insurance possibilities
available to consumers by trading in the asset markets.12
11See, e.g., Bonnisseau and Lachiri (2004), DeMarzo (1993), Dierker et al. (2002), Dreze et al. (2007),
Kelsey and Milne (1996) and many others.
12It is only in rather special environments, as pointed out by Diamond (1967) (see also the more recent
contribution by Carceles Poveda and Pirani (2009)), that the spanning condition holds and such issue does
7If agents are allowed inﬁnite short sales of the equity of ﬁrms, as in the standard GEI
model, a small ﬁrm will possibly have a large eﬀect on the economy by choosing a production
plan with cash ﬂows which, when traded as equity, change the asset span. It is clear that the
price taking assumption appears hard to justify in such context, since changes in the ﬁrm’s
production plan have non-negligible eﬀects on allocations and hence equilibrium prices. The
GEI literature has struggled with this issue, trying sometimes to maintain a competitive
equilibrium notion in an economic environment in which ﬁrms are potentially large.
In the environment considered in this paper, this problem does not arise since consumers
face a constraint preventing short sales, (3). This guarantees that each ﬁrm’s production
plan has a negligible (inﬁnitesimal) eﬀect on the set of admissible trades and allocations
available to consumers. As argued by Hart (1979) and Allen and Gale (1988), price taking
behavior is justiﬁed in this case, when the number of ﬁrms is large. Evidently, for price
taking behavior to be justiﬁed a no short sale constraint is more restrictive than necessary
and a bound on short sales of equity would suﬃce. We will explore how to allow for short
sales in Section 4.
When short sales are not allowed, while the decisions of a ﬁrm have a negligible eﬀect
on equilibrium allocations and market prices, still each ﬁrm’s decision has a non-negligible
impact on its present and future cash ﬂows. Price taking cannot therefore mean that the
price of its equity is taken as given by a ﬁrm, independently of its decisions. However, as
argued in the previous section, the level of the equity price associated to out-of-equilibrium
values of k,φ,B is not observed in the market. It is rather conjectured by the ﬁrm. In a
competitive environment we require such conjecture to be consistent, as required by condition
Cii) in the previous section. This notion of consistency of conjectures implicitly requires
they are competitive, that is, determined by a given pricing kernel, independent of the ﬁrm’s
decisions.13
But which pricing kernel? Here lies the core of the problem with the deﬁnition of the
objective function of the ﬁrm when markets are incomplete. When markets are incomplete,
in fact, the marginal valuation of out-of-equilibrium production plans diﬀers across agents
of diﬀerent types in equilibrium. In other words, equity holders may not be unanimous
with respect to their preferred production plan for the ﬁrm. In addition, the set of the
not arise.
13Independence of the pricing kernel in our set-up is guaranteed by the fact that MRS
i
(s) is evaluated at
the equilibrium consumption level of type i, for each i.
8ﬁrm’s shareholders is itself endogenously determined in equilibrium. The problem with the
deﬁnition of the objective function of the ﬁrm when markets are incomplete is therefore the
problem of aggregating the marginal valuations for out-of-equilibrium production plans of
the ﬁrm’s (actual and potential) equity holders. The diﬀerent equilibrium notions we ﬁnd
in the literature diﬀer primarily in the speciﬁcation of a consistency condition on q (k,φ,B),
the price map which the ﬁrms adopt to aggregate agents’ marginal valuations.
A minimal consistency condition on q (k,φ,B) is clearly given by condition i) in the pre-
vious section, which only requires the conjecture to be correct in correspondence to the ﬁrm’s
equilibrium choice. Duﬃe and Shafer (1986) indeed only impose such condition and consid-
ers as admissible any pricing kernel which satisﬁes it and induces prices with no arbitrage
opportunities, that is lies in the same space where agents’ marginal rates of substitution lie.
They ﬁnd then a rather large indeterminacy of the set of competitive equilibria.
Consider then the consistency condition proposed by Dreze (1974) in an important early







(s)[f(k,φ;s) − B], ∀k,B (10)
It requires the price conjecture for any plan k,φ,B to equal - pro rata - the marginal valuation
of the agents who in equilibrium are equity holders of the ﬁrm (that is, the agents who value
the most the plan chosen by the ﬁrm in equilibrium and hence choose to buy equity). It
does not however require that the ﬁrm’s equity holders are those who value the most any
possible plan of the ﬁrm. Intuitively, the choice of a plan which maximizes the ﬁrm’s value
with q(k,φ,B) as in (10) corresponds to a situation in which the ﬁrm’s equity holders choose
the plan which is optimal for them14 without contemplating the possibility of selling the
ﬁrm in the market, to allow the buyers of equity to operate the production plan they prefer.
Equivalently, the value of equity for out of equilibrium production plans is determined using
the - possibly incorrect - conjecture that the ﬁrms’ equilibrium shareholders will still own
the ﬁrm if it changes its production plan.
It is useful to compare our notion of equilibrium with that of Dreze (1974). Our consis-
tency condition Cii) requires that each plan is evaluated according to the marginal valuation
of the agent who values it the most. It is then easy to see that any allocation constituting
an equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 1 is also a Dreze equilibrium: all shareholders have in
14It is in fact immediate to verify that the plan which maximizes the ﬁrm’s value with q(k,φ,B) as in (10)
is also the plan which maximizes the welfare of the given set of shareholders of the ﬁrm.
9fact the same valuation for the ﬁrm’s production plan and their marginal utility for any other
possible plan is lower, hence a fortiori the chosen plan maximizes the weighted average of the
shareholders’ valuations. But the reverse implication is not true, i.e., a Dreze equilibrium is
not in general an equilibrium according to our deﬁnition.
Grossman and Hart (1979) propose another consistency condition and hence a diﬀerent









(s)[f(k,φ;s) − B], ∀k,B
We can interpret such notion as describing a situation where the ﬁrm’s plan is chosen by the
initial equity holders (i.e., those with some predetermined stock holdings at the beginning
of date 0) so as to maximize their welfare, again without contemplating the possibility of
selling the equity to other consumers who value it more. Equivalently, the value of equity
for out of equilibrium production plans is derived using the conjecture belief that the ﬁrm’s
initial shareholders stay in control of the ﬁrm also out of equilibrium.
To summarize, in our equilibrium notion the ﬁrm evaluates diﬀerent production plans
using possibly diﬀerent marginal valuations (that is, possibly diﬀerent pricing kernels, but
all still consistent with the consumers’ marginal rate of substitution at the equilibrium al-
location). This is not the case of Dreze (1974) nor of Grossman and Hart (1979). This is
a fundamental distinguishing feature of our equilibrium notion with respect to the many
others proposed in the GEI literature, including those which have applied theoretical con-
structs from the theory of social choice and voting to model the control of equity holders
over the ﬁrm’s decisions; see for instance DeMarzo (1993), Boyarchenko (2004), Cres and
Tvede (2005).
But the proof is in the pudding. Our equilibrium notion, besides being logically consistent
as no small ﬁrm has large eﬀects, also has some desirable properties: i) it delivers a Unanimity
result and ii) it produces equilibria which satisfy a constrained version of the First Welfare
Theorem.
3 Unanimity, eﬃciency, and Modigliani-Miller
We turn to state and prove our main results for the simplest benchmark economy just
introduced, with riskless debt and no short sales.
103.1 Unanimity
In our setup equity holders unanimously support their ﬁrm’s choice of the production and
ﬁnancial decisions which maximize its value (or proﬁts), as in (1). This follows from the
fact that, when the equity price map satisﬁes the consistency conditions Ci) and Cii), as we
already noticed in Remark 1, the model is equivalent to one where a continuum of types of
equity is available for trade to consumers, corresponding to any possible choice of k,φ,B the
representative ﬁrm can make, at the price q(k,φ,B).15
Unanimity then holds by the same argument as the one used to establish this property
for Arrow-Debreu economies. More formally, notice that we can always consider a situation
where, in equilibrium, each consumer holds at most a negligible fraction of each ﬁrm. The
eﬀect on consumers’ utility of alternative choices by a ﬁrm can then be evaluated using the
agents’ marginal utility. For any possible choice k,φ,B of a ﬁrm, the (marginal) utility






, is always less







. Hence the ﬁrm’s choice which maximizes the latter also
maximizes the equity holder’s utility.
Proposition 2 At a competitive equilibrium, equity holders unanimously support the pro-
duction and ﬁnancial decisions ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B of the ﬁrms; that is, every agent i holding a positive
initial amount θi
0 of equity of the representative ﬁrm will be made - weakly - worse oﬀ by any
other choice k′,φ′,B′ of the ﬁrm.
3.2 Eﬃciency
We show next that all competitive equilibria of the economy described exhibit desirable
welfare properties. Evidently, since the hedging possibilities available to consumers are
limited by the presence of the equity of ﬁrms and risk free bonds as the only assets, we
cannot expect competitive equilibrium allocations to be fully Pareto eﬃcient, but only to
make the best possible use of the existing markets, that is to be constrained Pareto eﬃcient
in the sense of Diamond (1967).
15As already argued in Remark 1, this property depends on the fact that consumers face a no short sale
condition. In Section 4, we will show that the unanimity, as well as the constrained eﬃciency, results extend
to the case where limited short sales are allowed, provided an appropriate speciﬁcation of the markets for
selling short assets is considered.
11To this end, we say a consumption allocation (ci)2
i=1 is admissible if:16


















i(s) + f(k,φ;s), ∀s ∈ S (11)
2. it is attainable with the existing asset structure: there exists B and, for each consumer’s
type i, a pair θi,bi such that:
c
i(s) = w
i(s) + [f(k,φ;s) − B ]θ
i + b
i, ∀s ∈ S (12)
Next we present the notion of eﬃciency restricted by the admissibility constraints:
Deﬁnition 2 A competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained Pareto eﬃcient if we can-
not ﬁnd another admissible allocation which is Pareto improving.
The validity of the First Welfare Theorem with respect to such notion can then be
established by an argument essentially analogous to the one used to establish the Pareto
eﬃciency of competitive equilibria in Arrow-Debreu economies.17
Proposition 3 Competitive equilibria are constrained Pareto eﬃcient.
3.2.1 Eﬃciency and asymmetric equilibria
Dierker et al. (2002) present an economy with the property that all Dreze equilibria are
constrained ineﬃcient. This appears to contradict the results in this paper. According
to our equilibrium notion, in fact, all equilibria are constrained eﬃcient, an equilibrium
exist and any equilibrium is also a Dreze equilibrium. The apparent contradiction is due,
however, to Dierker et al. (2002)’s restriction to symmetric equilibria. We will show that, in
their economy, a unique competitive equilibrium exists which is asymmetric and constrained
eﬃcient. This equilibrium only is selected by our deﬁnition.
16To keep the notation simple we state here the deﬁnition of admissible allocations for symmetric alloca-
tions, as we did for competitive equilibria. Our analysis and the eﬃciency result hold however in the more
general case where asymmetric allocations are allowed; see also the next section.
17See also Allen and Gale (1988) for a constrained eﬃciency result in a related environment.
12Let S = {s′,s′′}. There are two types of consumers, with type 2 having twice the mass of













0 = .95, w2
0 = 1 and w1(s) =
w2(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. The technology of the representative ﬁrm is described by
f(k,φ;s) = φk for s = s′ and (1 − φ)k for s = s′′, where φ ∈ Φ = [2/3,0.99]. We abstract
from the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions and set B = 0. The problem faced by ﬁrms in this envi-
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In this economy, Dierker et al. (2002) ﬁnd a unique Dreze equilibrium where all ﬁrms
choose a production plan with φ ≈ 0.7.18
According to our equilibrium concept, however, a symmetric equilibrium, where all ﬁrms
choose the same value of k and φ, does not exist. Given the agents’ endowments and
preferences, both types of consumers buy equity in equilibrium. It is then easy to see that
the ﬁrms’ optimality condition with respect to φ can never hold for an interior value of φ
nor for a corner solution.19 On the other hand, an asymmetric equilibrium exists, where
a fraction 1/3 of the ﬁrms choose φ1 = 0.99 and k1 = 0.3513 and the remaining fraction
chooses φ2 = 2/3 and k2 = 0.1667, type 1 consumers hold only equity of the ﬁrms choosing






0 = 3. Also, the marginal valuation of type 1 agents for the
equity of ﬁrms choosing φ2,k2 is 0.1122, thus smaller than the market value of these ﬁrms’
equity, equal to 0.1667, while the marginal valuation of type 2 agents for the equity of the
ﬁrms choosing φ1,k1 is 0.0105, smaller than the market value of these ﬁrms’ equity, equal to
0.3513. Therefore, at these values the ﬁrms’ optimality conditions are satisﬁed. It can then
be easily veriﬁed that this constitutes a competitive equilibrium according to our deﬁnition
and that the equilibrium allocation is constrained eﬃcient.
18The deﬁnition of Dreze equilibrium in Dierker et al. (2002) uses a speciﬁcation of the ﬁrms’ conjecture
over their market value for out of equilibrium production plans that diﬀers from the map q(φ,k) satisfying
the consistency conditions imposed here in two important respects. The market value is computed i) by
considering only the set of equilibrium shareholders rather than all consumers, and ii) by taking into account
the eﬀect of each plan on the marginal rate of substitution of shareholders rather than taking such rates as
given.
19Consider for instance φ = 0.99. To have an equilibrium at this value the marginal valuation of equity
for both consumers must be the same at φ = 0.99 and higher than at any other values of φ, but this second
property clearly cannot hold for type 2 consumers.
133.3 Modigliani-Miller
In this section we study the properties of the ﬁrms’ corporate ﬁnance and investment deci-
sions at an equilibrium. To this end, it is convenient to introduce the notation Ie to denote






f(¯ k, ¯ φ;s) − ¯ B
  
that is, the collec-
tion of all agents that in equilibrium either hold equity or are indiﬀerent between holding
and not holding equity. We can similarly deﬁne the collection Id of all agents i such that
¯ p = EMRS
i
(s), that is, the collection of all agents that in equilibrium either hold bonds or
are indiﬀerent between holding and not holding bonds. With a slight abuse of language we
denote the agents in Ie as equity holders and those in Id bond holders.
The ﬁrst order conditions are then diﬀerent according to whether the no default constraint
(2) binds or not. When it binds, we also need to take into account the possibility of joint
changes in B, k and φ to identify the appropriate ﬁrst order conditions. Letting s denote
the lowest output state20, we obtain the following characterization of the ﬁrms’ optimality
conditions:21
Proposition 4 The optimal production and ﬁnancing decisions of a ﬁrm are obtained:
(i) either at an interior solution, f(k,φ;s) > B, where all equity holders are also bond holders




























(ii) or at a corner solution, f(k,φ;s) = B, where all equity holders have again the same
marginal valuation for the bond, but such valuation may now be strictly less than its price p







































20This may clearly depend on k,φ but we omit to make it explicit for simplicity of the notation.
21We focus here on the conditions concerning the investment level k and capital structure B, ignoring
those regarding φ, which are straighforward.
14Thus in both cases all shareholders value equally the eﬀect on the payoﬀ of equity of an
inﬁnitesimal increase in the investment level k.22 In addition, at an interior solution such
value is always equal to the marginal cost of the investment. In contrast, at a corner solution
this value may be strictly smaller. This happens whenever all equity holders value the bond
less than p (that is, no equity holder is a bond holder), in which case the “gap” in the two
expressions is exactly equal.
We can now study the implications of the above characterization of the ﬁrm’s optimality
conditions for the ﬁrm’s optimal ﬁnancing choice, described by B. Is such choice indeter-
minate? Equivalently, does the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result hold in our setup? The
answer clearly depends on whether the solution of the ﬁrm’s problem obtains at a point
where the no default constraint is slack or binds. We consider each of these two cases in
turn.
When f(k,φ;s) > B the value of the ﬁrm V is locally invariant with respect to any
change in B. Furthermore, this invariance result extends to any admissible23 change in B:
all equity holders are in fact indiﬀerent with respect to any admissible, discrete change ∆B,
whether positive or negative. The other agents might not be indiﬀerent, but the optimality
of B,k,φ implies their valuation of the ﬁrm is always lower.
When the optimum obtains at a corner, f(k,φ;s) = B, either the same property still
holds (V is invariant with respect to any admissible change in B), or V is strictly increasing
in B. The latter property occurs when no equity holder is also a bond holder (in fact each
shareholder would like to short the bond), in which case the ﬁrm’s problem has a unique
solution for B.
To sum up, except in the case in which no equity holder is also a bond holder, at a
competitive equilibrium the value of the ﬁrm V is invariant with respect to any admissible
change in B. It is important to note however that, while in such situation the capital struc-
ture is indeterminate for any individual ﬁrm, this does not mean that the capital structure
of the economy, that is of all ﬁrms in the economy, is also indeterminate. In particular,
the equilibrium is invariant only to changes in the aggregate stock of bonds in the economy
∆B such that all equity holders remain also bond holders and this imposes a lower bound on
the aggregate value of ∆B consistent with the given equilibrium (given by −mini∈Ie ¯ bi/¯ θi).
22The same is also true for the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal change in φ.
23An upper bound on the admissible levels of B is obviously given by the value at which the no default
constraint binds, while the lower bound is 0.
15We have thus established the following:
Proposition 5 At a competitive equilibrium, the capital structure choice of each individual
ﬁrm is indeterminate, except when the ﬁrm’s no default constraint binds and no equity holder
is also a bond holder (in which case there is a unique optimal level of B, at f(¯ k, ¯ φ;s)). On
the other hand, the equilibrium capital structure of all ﬁrms in the economy is, at least
partly, determinate: for any equilibrium value ¯ B only the values of the capital structure for
all ﬁrms in the economy given by ¯ B + ∆B such that ∆B ≥ −mini∈Ie ¯ bi/¯ θi are consistent
with such equilibrium.
Thus the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance result does not fully hold in equilibrium. The
reason for this result is the presence of borrowing constraints, which restrict the set of
equilibrium values of the capital structures to an interval.24
3.3.1 Capital structure and business cycles
It is useful to illustrate the properties of the equilibrium and the ﬁrms’ production and
ﬁnancial decisions by considering a simple example, with two types of consumers, I = 2.
Suppose both consumers have initial equity holdings θ0 = .5 and preferences described by
Eui(ci
0,ci(s)) = u(ci
0) + βEu(ci(s)), i = 1,2; with u =
c1−γ
1−γ , γ = 2 and β = .95. The
production technology exhibits two factors and multiplicative shocks aﬀecting each of them:
f(k,φ;s) = φa1(s)kα + (1 − φ)a2(s)kα, where ah(s) is the aggregate productivity shock
aﬀecting factor h = 1,2 and φ ∈ Φ = {0,1} describes the choice of one of the two factors.
We assume α = .75. The structure of endowment and productivity shocks is reported in
Table 1, for S = {s1,s2,s3}.
s1 s2 s3
w1 2 3 3
w2 3 5 8
a1 2.0423 3.4286 4.9420
a2 2.2464 3.4286 4.4930
Table 1: Example with risk free debt: stochastic structure.
24See Stiglitz (1969) for a ﬁrst result along these lines.
16We can think of s1 as a recession state and s3 as a boom. Consider a case in which at
date 0 the state is the recession, i.e. wi
0 = wi(s1) for all i, and π(s1) = .1, π(s2) = .3 and
π(s3) = .6, i.e., the persistence of the recession is relatively low.25
We ﬁnd that in this case there is a unique equilibrium allocation where ﬁrms’ factor
loadings and investment are φ = 1, k = .20419 while their capital structure is given by any
level of B lying in the interval [.30615,.62034].
In order to better illustrate the determinants of the ﬁrms’ equilibrium capital structure,
set φ = 1 and treat parametrically the level of debt issued by each ﬁrm. For any given value
Bex of such debt we ﬁnd the investment level k which maximizes ﬁrms’ value, the individual
consumption and portfolio holdings {ci,θi,bi}2
i=1 solving (4) and the prices {q,p} such that
markets clear and the consistency conditions for q hold. In Figure 1 we plot, as Bex is varied
from 0 to .62034, the values obtained for the consumers’ asset holdings, on the ﬁrst line, and
their marginal valuations for the assets, on the second line. We can then use this ﬁgure to
determine when we have an equilibrium, which happens when the optimality condition for
the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions is satisﬁed. At Bex = 0 the default constraint does not bind.
From the top left panel we see that both consumers hold equity and from the lower right
panel that consumer 2 has a higher marginal valuation for the bond than consumer 1. At
Bex = 0 any ﬁrm can so increase its value26 by issuing debt, thus B = 0 is not an equilibrium
value.
As Bex is progressively increased from 0 to .30615, it remains true that consumer 2 has a
higher marginal valuation for the bond. As for equity, the two consumers’ valuation is still
the same for values of Bex less than .16421, while for values greater than .16421, agent 1’s
valuation becomes higher than 2’s and hence only 1 holds equity. Thus for all values of Bex
from 0 to .30615 it is not true that all equity holders are also bond holders; since the default
constraint never binds in this region, any ﬁrm can increase its value by issuing debt.
At Bex = .30615, on the other hand, the two consumers have the same marginal valuation
for the bond (bottom right panel) and only consumer 1 holds equity. Thus, all equity holders
25This implies that, if the ﬁrm loads everything on factor 1, i.e. φ = 1, the correlations of the consumers’
endowments with the ﬁrms’ productivity shocks are .7279 for 1 and .9963 for 2. If the ﬁrm loads everything
on factor 2 instead, i.e. φ = 0, the correlations of the consumers’ endowments with the ﬁrms’ productivity
shocks are .7662 for 1 and .9898 for 2.
26The ﬁrms’ value is determined using the equity price map obtained, as stated in the consistency condition
Cii) of Section 2.1, from the consumers’ marginal rate of substitution at the equilibrium allocation associated
to Bex = 0.









Stockholdings for 1: θ
1
Stockholdings for 2: θ
2










Bondholdings for 1: b
1
Bondholdings for 2: b
2










1´s marginal valuation of the stock:  MV
θ
1
2´s marginal valuation of the stock:  MV
θ
2









1´s marginal valuation of the bond:  MV
b
1
2´s marginal valuation of the bond:  MV
b
2
Figure 1: Parametric exercise: market clearing values, for given Bex ∈ [0,.62034], φ = 1.
i) First row: consumers’ asset holdings. ii) Second row: consumers’ willingness to pay for
equity EMRSi(s)[a1(s)kα − Bex] and bonds EMRSi(s), i = 1,2.
18are also bond holders and the prices and allocations obtained when Bex = .30615 (with
k = .20419) constitute an equilibrium of our model. As Bex is increased beyond .30615, up
to its maximal level such that the no default condition is satisﬁed (.62034), the allocation
and bond prices remain the same and still constitute an equilibrium. Values of Bex > .62034
can only be sustained if the ﬁrm’s investment k is increased so as to satisfy the no default
constraint: we ﬁnd however that this is never an equilibrium.
To sum up, the equilibrium consumption and investment levels are uniquely determined
while the capital structure of all ﬁrms in the economy is only partly determinate, given by
any B ∈ [.30615,.62034]. This is in accord with our ﬁndings in Proposition 5 for the case in
which the default constraint does not bind (as it is here).
Figure 2 then shows that, also in accord with Proposition 5, the ﬁnancial decision of each
individual ﬁrm is indeterminate. It plots the value of an arbitrary ﬁrm, −k+q(k,φ,B)+pB,
for φ = 1 and diﬀerent levels of k and B: we see that the ﬁrm’s maximal level is attained at
k = .20419 and all B ∈ [0,.62034].
We can also investigate how the equilibrium capital structure varies with the business
cycle, that is, in this simple environment, how it varies with the aggregate state when ﬁrms’
decisions are made and the persistence of the shocks. In the four columns of Table 2, we
have reported the equilibrium values for investment, asset prices, ﬁrms’ capital structure and
consumers’ portfolios for the cases where at date 0 the state is, respectively, a recession, as
above, or a boom (wi
0 = wi(¯ s1) for all i), and where the persistence of the initial state is
low (.1, as above) or high (.6). For the capital structure we report the lower bound of B
in the equilibrium region. As we see from the table, when the persistence of the shocks is low,
B increases from 1.068 to 1.6467 going from recession to boom. In a boom, with low persistence,
consumers expect to face hard times in the future and ﬁrms’ productivity to be low; hence they
demand debt relatively more than equity because, in this situation, debt represents a better hedge
than equity against expected low idiosyncratic shocks. On the other hand, when the persistence of
the shock is high, B decreases from 2.2077 to 1.8957 from recession to boom.27
27There is a large body of literature about the cyclical properties of leverage, deﬁned as
pB
−k+q+pB in our
notation. There appears to be a consensus that leverage is counter cyclical; see Korajczyk and Levy (2003),
and also Choe et al. (1993), Kashyap et al. (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Covas and Haan (2007), Levy and Hennessy (2007).
19Figure 2: Value of an arbitrary ﬁrm, −k+q(k,φ,B)+pB, as a function of k and B (for φ = 1),
where q(k,φ,B) is computed using the consumers’ MRSs at the equilibrium allocation. The
× in the plot represents the lower bound of the Modigliani-Miller region, i.e. B = .30615.
20Initial state s1 (recession) s3 (boom)






pB/(−k + pB + q) 1.068 1.6467
θ1; b1 1; 0 .37086; 0






pB/(−k + pB + q) 2.2077 1.8957
θ1; b1 1; 0 .45364; 0
Table 2: Equilibrium values for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the state at date 0 and diﬀerent
persistence of the initial state.
214 Intermediated short sales
We extend now the analysis to the case where consumers can sell short the ﬁrm’s equity.28 We
have already observed that, in environments where ﬁrms’ production decisions aﬀect the returns
on available assets, allowing for unlimited short sales of equity is inconsistent with the notion of
competitive equilibrium (that is, with price-taking behavior), as in this case many agents can take
large portfolio positions in a ﬁrm’s equity. But a short position on equity is, both conceptually and
in the practice of ﬁnancial markets, diﬀerent from a simple negative holding of equity. A short sale
is not a simple sale; it is a loan contract with a promise to repay an amount equal to the future
value of equity. In this sense, it is natural to model short sales as subject to frictions, because, e.g.,
of the possibility of default. Naturally we can allow such frictions to be arbitrarily small. In this
case, the notion of competitive equilibrium is well-deﬁned.
In this section, we consider a speciﬁc form of friction aﬀecting short sales of equity and we show
how the results of the previous section, including unanimity and constrained eﬃciency, extend to
the case where short sales are allowed.
In order to model short sales, we introduce ﬁnancial intermediaries, who can issue claims cor-
responding to both short and long positions (more generally, derivatives) on the ﬁrm’s equity.29As
before, equity is traded in the market at t = 0 at a price q and the outstanding amount of equity is
normalized to 1. Intermediaries bear no cost to issue claims, but face the possibility of default on
the short positions they issue (i.e., on the loans granted via the sale of such positions). We consider
here for simplicity the case in which the default rate on such positions is exogenously given and
equal to δ in every state. This is primarily for simplicity; the analysis and results of this section
extend to situations where the default rate varies with the type i of a consumer and the portfolio
held30 by him.31
To protect themselves against the risk of default on the short positions issued, intermediaries
have to hold an appropriate portfolio of claims (which acts then as a form of collateral against the
28We could allow for short sales of the bond as well, at only a notational cost.
29We could also allow intermediaries to issue diﬀerent types of derivatives on the ﬁrm’s equity, again at
only notational cost.
30For this it suﬃces that both the type and the portfolio choice of each individual are observable so that
the price of short positions in the derivative may depend on both, i.e. be type speciﬁc and nonlinear. We
can then think of the map describing the default of rate of an individual of a given type and with a given
portfolio as being endogenously determined in equilibrium as the result of the default choice of individuals,
when they face, for instance, some penalty for defaulting (as in Dubey et al. (2005)) and default is chosen
at the initial date.
31Any other cost of intermediation, as long as it is proportional to the amount intermediated, would give
us the same results.
22risk of their insolvency) and may charge a diﬀerent price for long and short positions. The best
hedge against default risk on short positions on equity is clearly equity itself and we focus so our
attention here on the case where only equity is held to hedge consumers’ default risk.
The self-ﬁnancing constraint of the intermediary intermediating m units of the derivative on
the ﬁrm’s equity is then:
m ≤ m(1 − δ) + γ (18)
where m is the number of long (and short) positions issued and γ the amount of equity of the ﬁrm
retained as collateral by the intermediary. Let q+ (resp. q−) be the price at which long (resp.
short) positions in the derivative issued by the intermediary are traded. The intermediary chooses
the amount of long and short positions in the derivative intermediated, m ∈ R+, and the amount
of equity held as collateral, γ ∈ R+, so as to maximize its total revenue at date 0:
max
m,γ (q+ − q−)m − qγ (19)
subject to the self-ﬁnancing constraint (18).
The intermediation technology is characterized by constant returns to scale. A solution to the




and is characterized by γ = δm and m > 0 only if q =
q+−q−
δ .
In this set-up derivatives are thus “backed” by equity in two ways: (i) the yield of each derivative
is “pegged” to the yield of equity of the ﬁrm;32 (ii) to issue any short position in the derivative, the
intermediary has to hold - as a collateral against the risk of his customers’ default - an appropriate
amount of equity of the same ﬁrm to whose return the derivative is pegged.
Let λi
+ ∈ R+ denote consumer i’s holdings of long positions in the derivative, and λi
− ∈ R+ his
holdings of short positions. The consumer’s budget constraints in this set-up33 are then as follows:
ci
0 = wi
0 + [−k + q + p B ]θi
0 − q θi − p bi − q+λi
+ + q−λi
− (20)
ci(s) = wi(s) + [f(k,φ;s) − B ](θi + λi
+ − λi
−(1 − δ)) + bi, ∀s ∈ S (21)








32The role of equity as a benchmark to which the return on derivatives can be pegged can be justiﬁed on
the basis of the fact that asset returns cannot be written as a direct function of future states of nature.
33In the expression of the date 1 budget constraint we take into account the fact that the consumer will
default on a fraction δ of his short positions (equivalently, that he defaults with probability δ).














The ﬁrm’s choice problem is unchanged, still given by (1) subject to (2). However, the speciﬁ-
cation of the equity price map q(k,φ,B) has to be properly adjusted, to reﬂect the fact that now
also intermediaries as well as consumers may demand equity in the market: q(k,φ,B) equals then
the maximal valuation, at the margin, among consumers and intermediaries, of the equity’s cash


























The second term on the right hand side of the above expression is the intermediaries’ marginal
valuation for equity and can be interpreted as the value of intermediation. Since an appropriate
amount of equity, to be retained as collateral, is needed to issue the corresponding derivative claims
(short and long positions on equity), the intermediary’s willingness to pay for any type of equity
is determined by the consumers’ marginal valuation for the corresponding derivative claims which
can be issued. Hence the above speciﬁcation of the ﬁrms’ equity price conjecture allows ﬁrms to
take into account also the eﬀects of their decisions on the value of intermediation.
A competitive equilibrium of the economy with short sales can then be deﬁned from the above
expressions along the same lines of Deﬁnition 1 in Section 2.1. Two possible situations can arise
then in equilibrium:
1. q = (q+ − q−)/δ > q+, which is in turn equivalent to q+ > q−/(1 − δ). In this case equity
sells at a premium over the long positions on the derivative claim issued by the intermediary
(because of its additional value as input in the intermediation technology). Thus all the
amount of equity outstanding is purchased by the intermediary, who can bear the additional
cost of equity thanks to the presence of a suﬃciently high spread q+ − q− between the cost
of long and short positions on the derivative.
2. q = q+. In this case there is a single price at which equity and long positions in the derivative
can be traded. Consumers are then indiﬀerent between buying long positions in equity and
the derivative and some if not all the outstanding amount of equity is held by consumers.
24When consumers hold all the outstanding amount of equity, intermediaries are non active at
equilibrium and the bid ask spread q+−q− is suﬃciently low (in particular, it is less or equal
than δq).
For this economy unanimity holds exactly as in the economy with no short sales. Furthermore,
we can again show that the First Welfare Theorem holds:
Proposition 6 Competitive equilibria of the economy with intermediated short-sales are constrained
Pareto eﬃcient.
The argument of the proof of such claim is essentially the same as the one for Proposition 3, and
again relies on the fact that a competitive equilibrium of the model described above is equivalent
to one where all markets, that is not only the markets for all possible types of equity (associated to
any possible choice k,φ,B of ﬁrms), but also the markets for all types of corresponding derivatives
are open for trade to consumers. In particular, for all (k′,φ′,B′)  =
 ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B
 
the buying price (that
















f(k′,φ′;s) − B′  
and at these prices both the market for long and short positions clear with a zero level of trade.
This follows from the above speciﬁcation of the consistency conditions imposed on the ﬁrms’ price
conjectures, hence the eﬃciency result.
Note that in the present economy with intermediated short sales consumers face no upper
bound on their short sales of equity, but the presence of a bid ask spread still limits their hedging
possibilities. It is interesting to compare our eﬃciency result with Theorem 5 in Allen and Gale
(1991), where it is shown that the competitive equilibria of an economy with ﬁnite, exogenous
bounds ¯ K on short sales are constrained ineﬃcient.34 In their set-up, long and short positions
trade at the same price, i.e., the bid ask spread is zero, and ﬁrms cannot internalize the eﬀect of
their choices, at the margin, on the value of intermediation. The ineﬃciency result in Allen and
Gale (1991) then follows from the fact that in equilibrium the expression of market value which ﬁrms
maximize ignores the eﬀect of their decisions on the value of the intermediated short sale positions
taken by agents. In other words, a ﬁrm is restricted not to exploit the gains from trade arising
from the demand for short positions in the ﬁrm’s equity. In our economy with intermediated short
34Though ﬁrms’ decisions in Allen and Gale (1991) concern primarily which securities to issue, their
analysis could be easily reformulated in a set-up where ﬁrms have to choose their level of output and take
ﬁnancial decisions, as in this paper.
25sales, instead, equity is an input in the intermediation process which allows short sales positions
to be traded in the market. Hence the ﬁrm takes into account the value of its equity not only for
the consumers but also for the intermediaries when making its production and ﬁnancial decisions.
The gains from trade due to intermediation are so exploited by ﬁrms.35
It is also useful to contrast our ﬁndings with the ineﬃciency result in Pesendorfer (1995). In
Example 2 Pesendorfer (1995) shows that a competitive economy where ﬁnancial intermediaries
may introduce complementary innovations in the market may get stuck at an equilibrium in which
no intermediary innovates, even though welfare would be higher if all innovations were traded
in the market. The result in this example is related to similar ﬁndings obtained in competitive
equilibrium models with diﬀerentiated goods; notably, Hart (1980) and Makowski (1980). In fact
the ineﬃciency arising in the economy considered by Pesendorfer is conceptually similar to that
of Allen and Gale (1991) just discussed: each intermediary is implicitly restricted not to trade
with other intermediaries; equivalently, equilibrium prices for non-traded innovations are restricted
not to include at the margin their eﬀect on the value of intermediation. If instead prices for non-
traded innovations were speciﬁed so as to equal the maximum between the consumers’ and the
intermediaries’ marginal valuation, as in our equation (22), constrained eﬃciency would obtain at
equilibrium.
5 Asymmetric information
We have shown that production and ﬁnancing decisions of ﬁrms cannot be fully separated, along
the lines of the Modigliani-Miller result, when markets are incomplete and short sales are either not
allowed or are intermediated. Nonetheless, as we have seen, unanimity and constrained eﬃciency
characterize competitive equilibria in these economies. In this section we will study economies
in which an additional link between production and ﬁnancing decisions is due to the presence
of asymmetric information between debt holders, equity holders and the ﬁrm’s management (the
agents who manage the ﬁrm and choose its production plans).
35Another way to understand the diﬀerence between the present set-up and the one in Allen and Gale
(1991) is by comparing the degree of completeness of the market in the two cases. Here, as argued above, the
situation is eﬀectively one where the markets for all possible derivative claims (corresponding to any plan
k,φ,B) are open and clear at the equilibrium prices. Hence if no ﬁrms chooses a particular plan k′,φ′,B′,
the market for the associated derivatives is cleared at no trade, possibly with a large spread between the
price for buying and selling positions. This is not the case in Allen and Gale (1991). To have an equilibrium
in their set-up, where long and short positions are restricted to trade at the same price, the bound on short
sales ¯ K must be 0 for the claims corresponding to values of k,φ,B diﬀerent from those chosen by ﬁrms.
Eﬀectively, then, these markets are closed and an ineﬃciency may so arise.
26In corporate ﬁnance models with such informational asymmetries have been studied for decades
now, at least since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976). In fact, these models are workhorses
for much of corporate ﬁnance and, in particular, for the study of the determinants of ﬁrms’ capital
structure and managerial incentive compensation.36 It is thus important to extend our analysis to
allow for the consideration of these issues. At the same time, while this earlier work is typically
cast in a partial equilibrium framework, a general equilibrium model allows to study the interaction
between managerial incentive contracts, the equilibrium property of the ﬁrms’ capital structure,
and the general equilibrium eﬀects of these agency problems, like the endogenous determination of
aggregate risk in the economy and its implications for asset pricing.
Once again we shall mostly stress foundational issues, from the speciﬁcation of the objective
function of the ﬁrm to the analysis of the eﬀects of its ﬁnancial decisions and the eﬃciency prop-
erties of equilibria, rather than applications. This is necessary because, while general equilibrium
theory has been extended to the study of economies with asymmetric information, from the seminal
work of Prescott and Townsend (1984) to, e.g., the more recent work of Dubey et al. (2005), Bisin
and Gottardi (1999) and Bisin and Gottardi (2006), most of this work concerns asymmetric infor-
mation on the consumption side.37 We shall consider two classes of models, where the asymmetric
information concerning the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing decisions is either of the moral hazard or the adverse
selection type. We shall see that the moral hazard/adverse selection distinction is not important
for unanimity, but it is for eﬃciency.
5.1 Unobservable risk composition - moral hazard
An implicit assumption in the analysis of the economy considered in the previous sections is that
ﬁrms’ production and ﬁnancial decisions k,φ,B are observed by all the agents so that they can
correctly anticipate, when they choose their trades in the asset markets at date 0, what the payoﬀ
in each state will be. This is in line with standard analysis of economies with traded equity or of
the Modigliani Miller Theorem. Still it may appear rather demanding. In this section we consider
then the case where the choice of φ, unlike that of k and B, is not observed by bond holders nor
by equity holders in ﬁnancial markets at time 0. In this environment, therefore, the characteristics
of the agents who are in charge of the ﬁrm’s production and technological decisions matter. We
call these agents managers and we postulate that managers are endogenously chosen in equilibrium
among the diﬀerent types of consumers in the economy by the ﬁrms’ equity holders.
36See Tirole (2006).
37Exceptions include Acharya and Bisin (2009), Magill and Quinzii (2002), Dreze et al. (2008), Zame
(2007), Prescott and Townsend (2006).
27An agent, if chosen as manager of a ﬁrm, will pick φ so as to maximize his utility, since the
choice of φ is not observable. The choice of φ aﬀects this agent’s utility both because the agent may
hold a portfolio whose return is aﬀected by φ but also because the agent may incur some disutility
cost associated to diﬀerent choices of φ. Let this disutility costs be vi(φ) for a type i consumer
We will assume that the manager’s portfolio is observable. In fact, without loss of generality, we
assume that managers cannot trade their way out of the compensation package chosen by the equity
holders.38
For simplicity, we continue to examine the case where the ﬁrm’s equity and debt are the only
assets in the economy, but we allow for the possibility that ﬁrms default on their debt in some states.






varies, like equity’s, with
the state as well as the ﬁrm’s production, k,φ, and ﬁnancial decisions, B.
The consumption side of the economy is as in Section 2: each consumer i is subject to endowment
shocks wi
0 at date 0 and wi(s) at date 1 in state s and has an initial endowment of shares θi
0.
The equity holders of a ﬁrm must now choose the level of its physical capital k, its ﬁnancial
structure, described by B, as well as the type i of agent serving as its manager and his compensation
package, so as to maximize the ﬁrm’s market valuation. The manager’s compensation package
consists of a net payment x0, in units of the consumption good at date 0, together with a portfolio
of θm units of equity and bm units of bonds and is chosen taking into account the manager’s
incentives (that is, the eﬀect of the compensation on the manager’s choice of φ). While φ is not
observed by either equity holders or bond holders, φ is indirectly chosen by the ﬁrm’s equity holders,
provided the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed. All agents in the economy
can then anticipate the manager’s choice of φ given his/her incentives, that is, given his/her type
i and his/her compensation package.
Each ﬁrm is still perfectly competitive and hence takes prices as given. It evaluates the eﬀects
of alternative choices of k,B,φ on the market value of its equity, as in the previous sections, on the
basis of a given price conjecture q(k,B,φ). In addition, the same is true now for the value of the
ﬁrm’s bonds, whose return is also risky in principle and varies with k,B,φ. The market valuation
of the ﬁrms’ debt for diﬀerent production and ﬁnancing choices is then also described by a given
price conjecture, p(k,φ,B).
Let Wi(φ,k,B) denote the total cost of the compensation package for a manager of type i,
which induces him to choose φ when the ﬁrm’s production and ﬁnancial decisions are given by k,B
and the corresponding market value of equity and bonds is q(k,φ,B), p(k,B,φ). This cost is given
by:
38See Acharya and Bisin (2009) and Bisin et al. (2008) for economies where much is made of the opposite
assumption.
28a) the payment xi
0 made to this agent at date 0,
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In order to analyze the ﬁrm’s choice we proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst state the optimal choice
problem of a ﬁrm who has a hired as manager a type i consumer:
V i = max
k,B,φ,xi


















































− vi(φ) ≥ ¯ Ui (26)
The ﬁrm maximizes its value under constraints (25) and (26). The ﬁrst is the incentive constraint
of a type i manager which ensures that, given his compensation, he indeed chooses φ rather than
any other φ′ ∈ Φ. With this constraint the ﬁrm internalizes the eﬀect of its choices of k and B on
φ. The second is the participation constraint, where ¯ Ui is the reservation utility for a manager of
type i, which is endogenously determined in equilibrium (see below). On the other hand, the no
default constraint is no longer present.
Next, the type ¯ ı ∈ I of agent to be hired as manager is chosen by selecting the type which




for V i indicating the solution of problem (24).
Each consumer of a given type j, if not hired as manager, has to choose his portfolio of equity
and bonds, θj and bj, taking as given the price of bonds p and the price of equity q, as well as the
dividends paid on equity at the two dates and the bonds’ yield, so as to maximize his utility.39.
39We maintain here the assumption that agents cannot sell short the ﬁrm’s equity nor its debt. No
conceptual diﬃculty is involved in allowing for intermediated short sales as in Section 4.












−k + q + pB − Wi 
θ
j
0 − q θj − p bj (29)






bj, ∀s ∈ S (30)
and
bj ≥ 0, θj ≥ 0, ∀j (31)
Let once again ¯ θj,¯ bj,¯ cj denote the solutions of this problem and ¯ Uj the corresponding level of the
agent’s expected utility. It represents the endogenous reservation utility for a type j agent if hired
as a manager.
In equilibrium, the bond and equity price maps faced by the ﬁrms must satisfy the following
consistency conditions:
Ci-mh) p = p(¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ) and q = q(¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ);

















i(s) denotes, as before, consumer i’s marginal rate of substitution between consumption
at date 0 and at date 1 in state s, evaluated at his equilibrium consumption choice ¯ ci. Condition
Ci-mh) requires that in equilibrium the prices faced by consumers in the market equal the prices
conjectured by the ﬁrms for their equilibrium choices. Condition Cii-mh) ensures that the ﬁrms’
conjecture concerning the market value of the bond and equity for each possible k,B,φ equals the
highest marginal valuation across all consumers for the return on these assets, evaluated at their
equilibrium consumption choices. The speciﬁcation of this price conjecture implicitly assumes that
investors correctly anticipate the payoﬀ distribution of bond and equity, given the observed levels
of k and B as before and now, the inference over φ, using (25), from the information over the
manager’s compensation package as well as k, B.
















i(s) + max{f(¯ k, ¯ φ;s) − ¯ B,0}θ
¯ ı,m + min
 
1,








i(s) + f(¯ k, ¯ φ;s), ∀s ∈ S (32)
40Recall that we have assumed for simplicity that the mass of agents of any given type i is equal to the
mass of existing ﬁrms. This is obviously by no means essential.
30Summarizing,
Deﬁnition 3 A competitive equilibrium of an economy with moral hazard is a collection
  ¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ,¯ ı,x¯ ı




¯ ci, ¯ θi,¯ bi, ¯ Ui I
i=1 , ¯ p, ¯ q,p( ),q( )
 
such that: i) ¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ,¯ ı,x¯ ı
0,θ¯ ı,m and b¯ ı,m solve the ﬁrm problem (27) given p( ),q( ) and {¯ Ui}I
i=1; ii)
p( ),q( ) satisfy the consistency conditions Ci-mh) and Cii-mh), respectively; iii) for all i, ¯ ci, ¯ θi,¯ bi
solve consumer i’s problem (28) s.t. (29), (30) and (31) for given ¯ p, ¯ q,¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ and ¯ W¯ ı = Wi(¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ);
¯ Ui = Eui(¯ ci
0,¯ ci(s)) and v) markets clear, (32).
5.1.1 Unanimity and eﬃciency
In the economy with moral hazard just described each ﬁrm chooses the production and ﬁnancing
plan which maximizes its value. The ﬁrm takes fully into account the eﬀects that its production
and ﬁnancing plan as well as its choice of management and associated compensation package have
on its value and, in equilibrium, the model is equivalent to one where the markets for all types
of equity and bonds are open. Consequently, by a very similar argument to the one developed in
Section 3, equity holders’ unanimity holds regarding the ﬁrm’s production and ﬁnancing decisions
as well as the choice of management; that is the choice of k and B, as well as the decision over the
manager and its compensation inducing the choice of φ.
Proposition 7 At a competitive equilibrium of the economy with moral hazard, equity holders
unanimously support the production and ﬁnancial decisions of ﬁrms as well as the choice of man-
agement, ¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ φ,¯ ı,x¯ ı
0,θ¯ ı,m,b¯ ı,m; that is, every agent i holding a positive initial amount θi
0 of equity
of the representative ﬁrm will be made - weakly - worse oﬀ by any other admissible choice of a ﬁrm
k′,B′,φ′,i′,xi′
0,θi′,m,bi′,m which satisﬁes (25) and (26).
We show next that all competitive equilibria of the economy described exhibit desirable wel-
fare properties. Evidently, we cannot expect competitive equilibrium allocations to be fully Pareto
eﬃcient: ﬁrst of all, the hedging possibilities available to consumers are limited by market in-
completeness (equity and risky debt are the only assets traded). More importantly, the economy is
characterized by the presence of moral hazard: the risk composition of the ﬁrms’ cash-ﬂow is chosen
by the ﬁrms’ managers and is not observable by the other agents (equity holders and bond holders).
Given these constraints, equilibrium allocations are Pareto eﬃcient, or constrained Pareto eﬃcient
in the sense of Diamond (1967) and Prescott and Townsend (1984).
More formally, a consumption allocation (ci)I
i=1 is admissible in the presence of moral hazard
if:
311. it is feasible: there exists a production plan k and a risk composition choice φ of ﬁrms such
that (11) holds;
2. it is attainable with the existing asset structure: that is, there exists B and, for each con-
sumer’s type i, a pair θi,bi such that






bi, ∀s ∈ S; (33)
3. It is incentive compatible: given the production plan k and the ﬁnancing plan B, there exists
¯ ı such that:
Eui(c¯ ı






b¯ ı) − v¯ ı(φ) ≥
Eui(c¯ ı






b¯ ı) − v¯ ı(φ′), ∀φ′ ∈ Φ
Constrained Pareto optimality is now straightforwardly deﬁned as in Deﬁnition 2, with respect
to the stronger notion of admissibility described above.
The First Welfare theorem can then be established by an argument very similar to the one used
earlier, for Proposition 3.
Proposition 8 Competitive equilibria of the economy with moral hazard are constrained Pareto
eﬃcient.
5.1.2 Capital structure with moral hazard
In equilibrium the ﬁnancing plans of the ﬁrm are determined both by the demand of investors and
by managers’ incentives. As in the economy considered in Section 3.3, investors’ demand for bonds
and equity gives the ﬁrm the incentive to leverage its position and ﬁnance production also with
bonds. With riskless debt, as we noted in Section 3.3, this implies a lower bound on the quantity of
corporate bonds issued by ﬁrms in equilibrium (while the upper bound is just given by feasibility,
that is the no default constraint). When the ﬁrms’ debt is risky, since the return on equity is a
nonlinear function of B, both the aggregate and the individual ﬁrm’s level of B are more precisely
determined in equilibrium.41
41If risky debt is allowed in the setup of Section 3.3 (with no moral hazard), an optimal choice for the
ﬁrms obtains when all equity holders have the same valuation - and the same as bond holders - for bonds’
payoﬀ in the no default states. Diﬀerently from the case where debt is riskless this does not imply that
all equity holders are also bond holders, since there is a second component of bonds’ payoﬀ, in the default
states. Moreover, all bond holders have the same valuation for each of the two components of bonds’ payoﬀs,
32In the presence of moral hazard the capital structure of the ﬁrm, together with the portfolio
composition of its manager, also plays a role in determining the unobservable choice of φ and
hence the returns on the ﬁrm’s bonds and equity. This fact can be used to align the manager’s
incentives with those of the ﬁrm’s equity holders and further contributes to determine the ﬁrm’s
capital structure. For instance, a manager of a leveraged ﬁrm with a large amount of the ﬁrm’s
equity in his portfolio has the incentive to choose values of φ that induce a higher loading on riskier
factors. This is because in this economy debt is risky and equity holders primarily beneﬁt from the
upside risk. Bond holders will therefore pay a premium for corporate bonds of less leveraged ﬁrms,
whose managers also hold a larger proportion of debt than equity.
Thus both the capital structure and the portfolio composition of its manager can be used to
enhance his incentives and hence to increase a ﬁrm’s value. As a consequence, the Modigliani-
Miller’s irrelevance region not only of aggregate but also of individual ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions is
even further reduced in the presence of moral hazard. We illustrate these issues by means of the
following example.
An example Consider the same speciﬁcation of the economy considered in the example of
Section 3.3.1 except for the fact that the structure of endowment and productivity shocks is now as
reported in the following42 Table 3. As before, at date 0 the state is s1, wi
0 = wi(s1) for all i, and
s1 s2 s3
w1 1 2 1
w2 1 1 2
a1 .1053 1.2857 2
a2 .1580 1.2857 1.7
Table 3: Example with risky debt: stochastic structure.
π(s1) = .1, π(s2) = .3 and π(s3) = .6. The disutility cost for implementing φ = 1 is vi (1) = .0154
for all i; on the other hand, vi (0) = 0 for all i.
taken separately. If in equilibrium default occurs in some states, the ﬁrms’ aggregate capital structure is
fully determinate, while individual capital structure is only partially determinate (the optimum is given by
an interval of values of B). Here we omit the formal statement of the ﬁrms’ optimality conditions with risky
debt and leave it to a technical appendix available online.
42These values imply that now, if the ﬁrm loads everything on factor 1, i.e. φ = 1, the correlations of
the consumers’ endowments with the ﬁrms’ productivity shocks are −.3441 for 1 and .8370 for 2. If it loads
everything on factor 2, φ = 0, the correlations are instead −.1932 for 1 and .7413 for 2.
33Moral Hazard No Moral Hazard
φ 1 1









pB/(−k + q + pB − W) .8764 .7631
U1 (manager) -1.77393 -1.774696
U1 (non − manager) -1.77393 -1.774696
U2 -1.654437 -1.654280
Table 4: Equilibrium values with risky debt and with or without moral hazard.
In addition, ﬁrms can issue risky debt. In Table 4 we report the equilibrium values respectively
for the case in which there is moral hazard (the choice of φ is not observable, hence both the
manager’s incentive and participation constraints must be satisﬁed) and the case in which there is
no moral hazard (the choice of φ is observable, hence only the manager’s participation constraint
must be satisﬁed): We see that in both cases the equilibrium choice of the loading factor is φ = 1,
the type 1 agent is hired as manager and the compensation package awards him all the shares
of the ﬁrm and no bonds. Also in both cases the participation constraint binds: the utility of a
type 1 agent if hired as a manager, U1 (manager), is in fact equal to his utility if he is not a
manager and free to trade in the markets, and default occurs only in state s1
43. But when there
is moral hazard the incentive constraint binds and the equilibrium investment and consumption
levels in the two cases are diﬀerent: we see in fact that the equilibrium levels of k and B are
higher with moral hazard, so that the dividends awarded to the manager in states s2 and s3 are
higher (.1261 > .1237; .2186 > .2123) and so is his total expected utility (−1.77393 > −1.774696).
Finally, and importantly, in both cases the capital structure not only in the aggregate but also
43With moral hazard: [.1053,1.2857,2].06553.75−.040425 = [−.0268,.1261,.2186]. Without moral hazard:
[.1053,1.2857,2].061875.75 − .035792 = [−.0227,.1237,.2123].
34of each individual ﬁrms is uniquely determined (with moral hazard, B = .040425; without moral
hazard, B = .035792).
5.2 Unobservable manager’s quality - adverse selection
Consider next an environment where the technology of an arbitrary ﬁrm is still described by the
production function f(k,φ;s), but φ represents the quality of the agent hired as manager of the
ﬁrm, which aﬀects the stochastic structure of the ﬁrm’s future output. Thus φ ∈ Φ is not as
in the previous section an unobservable choice of the ﬁrm’s manager, but a privately observed
characteristic of each agent in the economy which aﬀects the productivity of the ﬁrm if the agent is
hired as manager of the ﬁrm. We also assume managers receive some beneﬁts from control, given
by ςφ, in units of the consumption good, which are diverted from the ﬁrm’s output at time 1.
The problem of the equity holders of the ﬁrm is again that of choosing the production plan
k and the ﬁnancial structure B, as well as the type of agent serving as manager, were the type
is now given by an observable component i and a second, unobservable component, the quality
φ, together with the associated manager’s compensation package. The manager’s compensation
package consists of an amount x0 of the consumption good at date 0, θm units of equity and bm of
bonds. Since agents know also the quality component φ of their type at the beginning of date 0,
before they may be hired as managers, this economy is one of adverse selection.
For simplicity we restrict here our attention on the case where Φ is a ﬁnite set. Let χi
φ denote
the mass of agents of type i and quality φ. To ensure that ﬁrms are never rationed in equilibrium
in their demand of managers we need to appropriately redeﬁne the size of the mass of ﬁrms in the
economy and set it here at a level smaller than χi
φ for all i,φ. Furthermore, we assume that the
ﬁrms’ technology is such that some production and ﬁnancing levels and a compensation package can
always be found so as to separate managers of diﬀerent unobservable qualities. This is guaranteed
by the following (stricter than necessary) single crossing property assumption:
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denote the total cost of
the compensation package xi
0,θi,m,bi,m for a manager of type i and quality φ, when the ﬁrms’
decisions are given by k,B and the corresponding market value of equity and bonds is q(k,B,φ),
35p(k,B,φ). Hence the value maximization problem of a ﬁrm who is hiring as manager an agent of
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Constraint (34) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which requires that a ﬁrm choosing a
manager of type i and quality φ will set a compensation package which agents of the same type i
but diﬀerent quality φ′  = φ will not accept. This is because their reservation utility ¯ Ui, describing
as before the utility they can get by not being a manager and trading in the existing markets,
is higher. Constraint (35) is then the participation constraint, which requires instead that an
agent of type i and quality φ indeed prefers being hired as manager and receiving the proposed
compensation package than receiving his reservation utility, ¯ Ui.
The single crossing property guarantees that, for any i, there always exists a compensation
scheme such that constraints (34) and (35) are satisﬁed non-trivially: only agents of quality φ
become managers and all agents of quality φ′  = φ prefer not to. However ﬁrms may also choose a
production and a ﬁnancing plan k,B and a compensation package such that a non singleton subset
Φ′ ⊆ Φ of quality types prefer being hired as managers. The speciﬁcation of the program yielding
the maximal value V i(Φ′) of the ﬁrm in this case is analogous to the one above.
In equilibrium ﬁrms choose the type i and quality φ (or alternatively, sets of qualities Φ′) of




If at equilibrium the optimal choice of the ﬁrm is to hire a single quality type ¯ φ as manager,
we call the equilibrium separating, following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). On the other hand, if
the optimal choice is to hire a nonsingleton set Φ′ ⊆ Φ of quality types, we say the equilibrium is
(partially) pooling, where agents of diﬀerent quality become managers.
By a similar argument as in Bisin and Gottardi (2006), we can show that competitive equi-
librium are necessarily separating and moreover that, diﬀerently from the economy with moral
36hazard, equilibrium allocations are not in general constrained Pareto eﬃcient, in the sense of Dia-
mond (1967) and Prescott and Townsend (1984). On the other hand, unanimity still holds in this
environment.
6 Conclusion
In the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, such as incomplete markets and/or borrowing restrictions
and informational asymmetries between managers and equity holders or bond holders, production
decisions are not necessarily separated from ﬁnancing decisions. Corporate ﬁnancing decisions, in
these economies, are therefore not indeterminate and one can investigate their interaction with the
properties of the equilibrium allocation and prices. The conceptual problems usually associated
with modelling ﬁrm decisions when markets are incomplete or with asymmetric information can
be overcome with appropriate, and natural modeling choices. We conclude therefore that the
economies we study in this paper are an appropriate foundation for macroeconomics and ﬁnance
in production economies when ﬁnancial markets are incomplete and/or information is asymmetric.
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407 Appendix - Not for Publication
We collect here most proofs.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We only provide here an outline of the main steps. Since short sales are not allowed, the consumers’
budget set is non empty, compact and convex for all44 (φ,k) ∈ Φ × K, all B ≥ 0 satisfying (2),
and all (p,q) ≫ 0. Under the assumptions made on individual preferences, consumers’ net demand
functions (for bonds, equity and the consumption good) are then well behaved. Using condition
Cii), the pricing map q(φ,k,B) in the ﬁrm’s problem (1) can be written as a function of the agents’
consumption (ci
0,(ci(s)s∈S). The convex hull of the correspondence describing the ﬁrms’ net supply
of bonds and of the consumption good as well as their choice of the other technology parameter






], ci(s) ∈ (0,max
 
i wi(s)]
∀s ∈ S. By a standard ﬁxed point argument there exists so a value of ¯ φ,¯ k, ¯ B, ¯ p, ¯ q,(¯ ci
0,(¯ ci(s)s∈S)I
i=1
such that: (a) ¯ q equals the value of the price map speciﬁed in condition Cii) evaluated at ¯ φ,¯ k, ¯ p
and (¯ ci
0,(¯ ci(s)s∈S)I
i=1, (b) ¯ φ,¯ k, ¯ B belong to the convex hull of the ﬁrms’ optimal choice correspon-
dence when p = ¯ p and the terms MRS
i appearing in the equity price map speciﬁed in condition
Cii) are evaluated at (¯ ci
0,(¯ ci(s)s∈S)I
i=1, (c) for each i = 1,..,I, (¯ ci
0,(¯ ci(s)s∈S) is a solution of the
choice problem of type i consumers at ¯ q, ¯ p, (d) the market clearing conditions hold. Finally, by
Caratheodory’s Theorem, ¯ φ,¯ k, ¯ B can be written as a convex combination of ﬁnitely many points
belonging to the ﬁrms’ optimal choice correspondence.￿
7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose (ˆ ci)I
i=1 is admissible and Pareto dominates the competitive equilibrium allocation (¯ ci)I
i=1.





exists such that (11) and (12)
are satisﬁed. Since ¯ ci is the optimal choice of a type i consumer at the equilibrium prices ¯ q, ¯ p and,
as argued in Remark 1, the consumer’s choice problem is analogous to one where any possible type
of equity is available for trade, at a price q(k,φ,B) satisfying the consistency condition Cii), we get
ˆ ci
0 + ˆ qˆ θi + ¯ p ˆ bi − wi
0 ≥ ¯ ci
0 + ¯ q ¯ θi + ¯ p ¯ bi − wi
0 ,
44Strictly speaking, the nonemptiness of the budget set is ensured for all k ∈ K provided the maximal
element of k ∈ K, kmax, is such that wi
0 ≥ θi
0kmax for all i.
41where ˆ q = maxi EMRS
i(s)
 




−ˆ k + ˆ q + ¯ p ˆ B
 
θi
0 + τi ≥
 




for τi ≡ ˆ ci
0 + ˆ qˆ θi + p ˆ bi −
 




0. Since (36) holds for all i, strictly for some i,
summing over i yields:
 







−¯ k + ¯ q + ¯ p ¯ B
 
(37)
The fact that ¯ k, ¯ φ, ¯ B solves the ﬁrms’ optimization problem (1) in turn implies that:
−¯ k + ¯ q + ¯ p ¯ B ≥ −ˆ k + ˆ q + ¯ p ˆ B,













a contradiction to (11) at date 0. ￿
7.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Note ﬁrst that
q(k,φ,B + dB) = max
i
EMRS
i(s) [f(k,φ;s) − B − dB].
Since for all i / ∈ Ie, EMRS
i(s) [f(k,φ;s) − B] < q(k,φ,B), the max in the above expression is
attained for some i ∈ Ie and hence
q(k,φ,B + dB) = q(k,φ,B) + max
i∈Ie EMRS
i(s) [−dB].






























where fk denotes the derivative of f with respect to k.
The ﬁrst order conditions are then diﬀerent according to whether the no default constraint (2)
binds or not. Recalling that s denotes the lowest output state they are given by:
























− 1 ≥ 0;































∂k−, the above conditions (with respect


































− 1 ≤ 0. (41)















Note that (42) is always satisﬁed. In particular, it holds as equality when at least one equity
holder is also a bond holder, or Ie ∩Id  = ∅, and as a strict inequality when no equity holder
is also a bond holder, or all equity holders would like to short the risk free asset.
To verify whether a solution indeed obtains at f(k,φ;s) = B when (43) holds, we need to




































dk ≥ 0 for dB = fk(s)dk < 0






































where the term on the r.h.s. is always nonnegative by (43) and the one on the l.h.s. is obviously



































and again both terms are non negative.
























45This is obviously not necessary when the ﬁrst order conditions are satisﬁed at an interior solution, that
is when (13) and (14) hold.
46Without loss of generality, we can limit our attention to changes in B and k such that the no default
constraint still binds, or fk(s)dk ≥ dB holds as equality.





























































This implies that (15), (16), (17) hold, thus completing the proof.￿
45